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A RECOMMENDATION FOR JUVENILE JURY TRIALS
IN MINNESOTA
Nearly one century ago, advocatesfor the legal reform of the juvenile justice system
declared the existing system "inhumane. " Since then, progress has been slow but
steady. Nonetheless, juvenile law contitues to be an active area of the law, espe-
cially in Minnesota. The author of this Note recommends an additional step to-
ward reform of the state's juvenile law, the availability of theju trial tojuvenles
in delinquency proceedings.
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 587
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS . 588
A. Expansion of Children's Constitutional Rights .............. 588
B. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Juvenile Has No
Constitutional Right to a Jury ............................ 594
C State Experimentation After McKeiver ................... 598
III. THE RATIONALE FOR JUVENILE JURY TRIALS IN
M INNESOTA . .............................................. 600
A. Crimital Treatment ofJuveniles in Mnnesota .............. 600
B. Judge Versus ..................................... 608
C The Juiy Trial's Effect on The Informal Atmosphere of Juvenile
Proceedings ............................................ 613
D. The Juvenile Adversary System ........................... 615
E The Efticiency ofJuvenile Jugy Trials .................... 615
F Juy Trials and Confidentiah'ty ........................... 616
IV . CONCLUSION .............................................. 617
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1980, Minnesota has shifted the focus of its juvenile justice phi-
losophy from rehabilitation to deterrence and punishment., The deter-
minative factor in treatment of the juvenile offender is no longer the best
interests of the child. 2 Today, Minnesota's juvenile system treats the ju-
venile offender essentially as a criminal, yet denies the child a trial by
1. In 1980, the Minnesota Legislature amended the purpose clause of the Juvenile
Court Act. Act of April 15, 1980, ch. 580, § 3, 1980 Minn. Laws 966 (codified as amended
at MINN. STAT. § 260.011 (1982)). The new purpose clause reflects an increased emphasis
on personal responsibility for juvenile offenses, punishment, deterrence, and public protec-
tion. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
Additionally, a new set of procedural rules for juvenile courts was adopted by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1983. See MINN. R. Juv. P. (1984) (effective May 1, 1983).
The new juvenile court rules represent a significant shift away from the rehabilitative
ideals of Minnesota's original juvenile court laws. See infra notes 132-34 and accompany-
ing text.
2. See tmfra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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jury.3 By depriving the child of the protections accorded adults as well
as the solicitous treatment generally accorded children, the present sys-
tem realizes the fear expressed by the United States Supreme Court: the
child in the midst of a delinquency proceeding is subjected to the "worst
of both worlds." 4 With this shift to criminal treatment, due process
should include jury trials for juveniles in Minnesota.
This Note first examines the progression and regression of children's
constitutional rights as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
5
The arguments for and against the implementation of a juvenile jury
system in Minnesota are examined and discussed. In conclusion, the au-
thor recommends that children who are prosecuted for delinquency in
Minnesota's juvenile courts be accorded jury trials.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS
A. Expansion of Children's Constitutional Rights
In 1899, the first juvenile court was established in Illinois6 after wide-
spread public outcry against inhumane treatment of juveniles involved
in the court process. 7 The purpose of the Illinois Act was to afford
3. For a discussion of the "criminal" treatment of the juvenile, see infra notes 90-141
and accompanying text.
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that a juvenile is not constitution-
ally entitled to a trial by jury. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). The
Court did not absolutely bar jury trials for juveniles, but left that decision to the states. Id
at 547. Minnesota forbids jury trials in delinquency proceedings. MINN. STAT. § 260.155,
subd. 1 (1982).
4. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
5. Children's rights under the Constitution have been discussed extensively in nu-
merous law journals. See, e.g., Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL
L.Q. 387 (1961); Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender. Disman-
tling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1980); GeorgeJuvenile Delinquency
Proceedings.- The Due Process Model, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 315, 318-28 (1968); Ketcham,
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Last Word on Juvenile Court Adjudications?, 57 CORNELL L.
REV. 561 (1972); Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime." Proposal
for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 656, 657-708 (1980); Note, Rights
and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 281 (1967); CommentJug, Trials
for Juveniles." Rhetoric and Reality, 8 PAC. L.J. 811 (1977); Case Comment, No Constitutional
Right to Trial byJury in Delinquency Proceedings, 56 MINN. L. REV. 249 (1971).
6. For a general discussion of the history of the juvenile court, see A. LEMERT, SO-
CIAL ACTION AND LEGAL CHANGE 25 (1970). See also A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS/THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977); Fox,Juvenile Justice Reform. An Historical Per-
spective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Schulz, The Cycle ofJuvenile Court Htitory, 19 CRIME
& DELINQ. 457 (1973).
7. "[D]isrupted families, overcrowded housing, poverty, slums, alcoholism and resul-
tant increasing crime and delinquency spurred reformers into establishing a separate set of
courts for youth." Kittle, Juvenile Justie Philosophy in Minnesota, 34 Juv. & FAM. CT. J.,
Feb. 1983, at 93. For an extensive discussion on the history of the child saving movement
in America in the 1800's, see A. PLATT, supra note 6. For a discussion of the child savers as
they exist today, see P. PREscOrr, THE CHILD SAVERS (1981).
[Vol. 10
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juveniles more humane and protective treatment by the state than previ-
ously provided. This was effectuated by an informal court which at-
tempted to individualize the hearing and disposition of the juvenile
offender.8 Under the Act, theparenspatriae doctrine was implicitly recog-
nized. The doctrine was based upon the theory that the state, looking
out for the child's welfare and best interests, acted through the court as a
parent of the child.9
Although establishment of the juvenile court marked an improvement
in juvenile proceedings, no specific constitutional safeguards were ex-
tended to children.1o The United States Supreme Court first explicitly
extended constitutional protection to juvenile offenders in 1948:' In Haley
v. Ohio, I' the United States Supreme Court held that the fourteenth
amendment prohibited the admission of a fifteen-year-old's coerced con-
fession into evidence during his criminal trial for homicide. 12 The
Court's holding acknowledged the need to extend due process to
juveniles in delinquency proceedings.
Since Haley, the United States Supreme Court has manuevered its way
through a series of cases involving the constitutional rights of children,
stating that children are persons within the meaning of the Constitu-
8. See supra note 6. Initially, juveniles were treated as adults when faced with a
criminal charge and any due process received by adults was applied with equal force to
juveniles. See Expare Becknell, 119 Cal. 496, 51 P. 692 (1897); People ex rel. O'Connell v.
Turner, 55 I11. 280, 8 Am. Rep. 645 (1870).
9. The doctrine of parens patn'ae originated in England, where the King or Queen
was viewed as "parent" of neglected or abandoned children. Stuart,Judi-ia/ Powers Of Non-
Judges- The Legitimacy Of Referee Functions In Minnesota Courts, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 65,
80 (1980). Minnesota also adopted the parens patriae stance, as evidenced by the follow-
ing language:
The language of the constitution does not apply where the state acts as the com-
mon guardian of the community, exercising its power whenever the welfare of an
infant demands it, or where the state acts in the legitimate exercise of its police
power. Therefore the lawmakers were not prohibited from conferring jurisdic-
tion in such cases upon any of the judicial officers of the state.
State ex re. Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 359, 52 N.W. 935, 936 (1892); see also Loyd v.
Youth Conservation Comm'n, 287 Minn. 12, 17, 177 N.W.2d 555, 558 (1978); infra note
20.
10. See, e.g., A. PLATr, supra note 6, at 67. Professor Platt states:
Since the child savers professed to be seeking the best interest of their 'wards',
there was no need to formulate legal regulation of the right and duty to treat in
the same way that the right and duty to punish had formerly been regulated. In
effect, the new penology reified the dependent status of children by disen-
franchising them of legal rights.
Id
11. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
12. Id The Court stated, "[N]either man nor child can be allowed to stand con-
demned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law." Id. at
601. This statement is somewhat surprising in view of the Court's holding in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (due process stops short of allowing a juvenile the con-
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tion. ta Notwithstanding the increased recognition of children's rights,
the Court has declared that the right to a jury trial is not essential for
fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings.14
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court first discussed the "delin-
quent" child's constitutional rights.15 The Court in Kent v. United States 16
held that due process rights must be extended to juveniles in delinquency
proceedings.' 7 Significantly, it did not mandate that the constitutional
safeguards be equivalent to those granted adults.18 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court discussed the inherent special nature of the juvenile
court system: 19
Its proceedings are designated as civil rather than criminal. The Juve-
nile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the
child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The
objectives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for
the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility,
guilt and punishment. The State isparenspatn'ae rather than prosecut-
13. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (juvenile protected against double
jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (charges against juvenile that would consti-
tute a crime if committed by an adult must be proved beyond reasonable doubt); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (granting juveniles full constitutional rights to counsel, notice,
confrontation, cross-examination, and right against self-incrimination); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (reference hearing must be procedurally sufficient to satisfy
basic constitutional guarantees of due process and fairness). But see McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (juvenile not constitutionally entitled to jury trial in the
adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding).
14. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548 (1971).
15. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
16. Id
17. Id at 557. Kent did not extend to juveniles the right to bail, indictment by a
grand jury, speedy and public trial, or trial by jury. Id at 555. Kent did extend to
juveniles the rights to discovery, hearings, and counsel prior to waiver of jurisdiction by
the juvenile court. Id. at 561.
Kent involved a 16-year-old juvenile charged with housebreaking, robbery, and rape.
After an initial hearing, the juvenile court declined jurisdiction over the matter, instead
recommending trial at the district court level. Id at 546. Petitioner was later convicted
by the district court on charges of housebreaking and robbery. Id at 550.
On appeal, counsel for petitioner argued that the waiver was defective because there
was no hearing prior to the waiver, the juvenile court made no findings, and counsel had
no access to the reasons relied upon by the court in its decision to waive jurisdiction. Id at
552. The Supreme Court stated:
We do not consider whether, on the merits, Kent should have been transferred;
but there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremen-
dous consequences without ceremony -without hearing, without effective assist-
ance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court
of justice dealing with adults, with respect to a similar issue, would proceed in
this manner. It would be conceivable if society's special concern for children
• . . permitted this procedure. We hold that it does not.
Id at 554.
18. Id at 556.
19. Id at 554-57. See generaly Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversay System:
Arobltems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 9-10.
[Vol. 10
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ing attorney and judge.20
To guard against improper use of the parens patriae power, the Kent
Court held that a juvenile is constitutionally entitled to discovery, 2 1 a
hearing,22  and counsel prior to waiver of the juvenile court's
jurisdiction. 2
3
One year later, the constitutional protection granted juveniles in Kent
was further expanded in the leading case of In re Gault. 24 The juvenile in
Gault was adjudicated delinquent on a charge of making lewd telephone
calls.25 He was subsequently ordered confined to an industrial school
until he reached the age of twenty-one.26 This sanction was imposed
without adequate notice to the parties,
27 representation by counsel,28
20. 383 U.S. at 554-55. In taking the role ofparenspatrtae, the state assumes a fictional
role as parent of the child. In this role, the state attempts to discern the best interests of
the child. See Handler, supra note 19, at 9-10. The Kent Court recognized the inherent
potential for abuse in theparenspatriae concept, stating that the right to act as parent was
neither unlimited nor an "invitation to procedural arbitrariness." 383 U.S. at 555.
21. 383 U.S. at 562. The Court was dealing specifically with the accessibility of cer-
tain "social" records concerning the defendant. Because such records are used in adjudi-
cations, it is essential that defense counsel have access to them.
22. Id The Court stated:
We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administra-
tive hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials
of due process and fair treatment.
Id (citing Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959)).
23. Id. at 561. "The right to representation by counsel is not a formality. It is not a
grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence ofjustice. Appointment
of counsel without affording an opportunity for a hearing of a 'critically important' issue is
tantamount to denial of counsel." Id
24. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, the Court stated that counsel for juveniles is required
because "[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delin-
quent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution." Id at 36.
Gault was an appeal to the United States Supreme Court after denial by the Arizona
Supreme Court of a habeas corpus petition alleging the unconstitutionality of Arizona's
juvenile laws. Id at 9-10. The Court took the opportunity to discuss and expand the
constitutional safeguards extended to children, using the oft-repeated phrases that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone," and "the
condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." Id at 13, 28.
After being adjudicated delinquent at a juvenile hearing under a charge of making
lewd telephone calls, the 15-year-old petitioner in Cau/t was ordered confined at an indus-
trial school for six years, until he reached the age of 21. Id. at 7. The Supreme Court
found a number of violations in the petitioner's confinement, including: inadequate no-
tice of charges, inadequate factual basis for confinement, no confrontation afforded, no
record of the proceeding, no self-incrimination protection, and no appeals permitted. Id
at 4-11. Although the Gault Court recognized the seriousness of a delinquency adjudica-
tion, it did not discuss the jury issue. See id at 24-25.
25. Id at 7-8.
26. Id
27. Id at 5-7.
28. Id at 5, 7.
1984]
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cross-examination of the complaining witness,29 or observance of the ju-
venile's right against self-incrimination.3O The hearing did not establish
a factual basis for the charge.3  The proceedings took place without a
record, 32 and appeal was not allowed.33
Despite the Gault Court's condemnation of the juvenile's due process
denials, it did not require states to afford juveniles the full panoply of
adult constitutional safeguards.34 Thus, a delinquency adjudication re-
sulting in the deprivation of a child's liberty for a period of years re-
mained subject to a less strict standard of review than adults in
essentially the same position. The Court reasoned that since delinquency
proceedings were civil, not criminal in nature, the procedural protections
for adults and children need not be identical.35
Gault reaffirmed the Kent holding that a juvenile is entitled to counsel
prior to waiver of any rights and extended the holding to include the
right at all stages of delinquency proceedings.36 The Gault Court also
29. Id at 7.
30. Id at 6.
31. Id at 5.
32. Id
33. Id at 8.
34. See id at 30.
35. Cf id at 23-24. The Court noted that referring to a juvenile as a "delinquent"
has "only slightly less stigma than the term 'criminal' applied to adults." Id
The civil label attached to delinquency proceedings derives from the parens patrae
concept. Id at 17; see supra note 9. The Gault Court criticized the concept, however,
stating that "its meaning is murky and its historical credentials are of dubious relevance."
387 U.S. at 16. Still, the doctrine remains in use today. The Gault Court held the concept
was needed despite its problems; if the natural parents of the child do not assert their
custodial duties properly, the state must intervene and take over the position of parent in
determining the best interests of the child. See id at 17-18; see also Petition of Ferrier, 103
11. 367, 371-73 (1882); Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1839); Shears, Legal
Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A.J. 719, 719-20 (1962).
Once the parens patriae privilege is exercised, constitutional protections must be ex-
tended to the child to check the power granted the state. "[U]nbridled discretion, how-
ever benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."
387 U.S. at 18; see Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959) Judge Prettyman
lists authority supporting this in 51 jurisdictions).
36. 387 U.S. at 36; see supra note 23; see also In re Welfare of T.D.F., 258 N.W.2d 774
(Minn. 1977) (juvenile has right to effective counsel); MINN. R. Juv. P. 4 (1984) (right to
counsel).
Counsel is required by due process to "cope with problems of law, to make skilled
inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings and to ascertain whether
[the juvenile] has a defense and to prepare and submit it." 387 U.S. at 36. For a general
discussion of a juvenile's right to counsel, see id at 34-42. The Gault Court stated:
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that in respect of proceedings to determine deliquency which may result
in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the
child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by
counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel
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held that juveniles must be given notice of all pending charges3 7 and
granted the privilege against self-incrimination.38 Lack of a valid confes-
sion entitled the juvenile to the dual rights of confrontation and cross-
examination.3 9 In reaching these conclusions, the Gault Court recog-
nized the similarities between delinquency and adult proceedings.
40
In 1970, the Supreme Court continued its expansion of juvenile consti-
tutional protections in In re Winsht'p. 41 The Court in Wz4isht'p held that
charges must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in delinquency ac-
tions. 42 "The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake inter-
ests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he
would be stigmatized by the conviction." 4 3 Although the Court retained
the civil label attached to juvenile proceedings, it minimized the distinc-
37. See 387 U.S. at 31-34 (general discussion of the juvenile's right to notice); see also In
re Welfare of Raino v. State, 255 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. 1977) (juvenile has right to notice of
all charges against him).
The notice "must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so
that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded" and must set out the charges
with specificity. 387 U.S. at 33; see also MINN. R. Juv. P. 9 (1984) (notice). Notice must
be the type acceptable in criminal and civil proceedings. See 387 U.S. at 33.
For applications of adequate notice to criminal settings, see Cole v. Arkansas, 333
U.S. 196 (1948); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-78 (1948). See also Antieau,supra note 5, at
395; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenil Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957).
38. For the Court's general discussion of the juvenile's protection against self-incrimi-
nation, see 387 U.S. at 42-57. The juvenile in Minnesota also has the right to remain
silent. MINN. R. Juv. P. 6 (1984). In granting the child the right against self-incrimina-
tion, the Supreme Court ignored the civil label attached to the delinquency proceedings.
The Gault Court stated, "To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of
the feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience which has been attached to juve-
nile proceedings." 387 U.S. at 49-50.
The type of statement sought from the juvenile is essentially a confession, therefore
the privilege must be invoked. Id at 48. "It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of
the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to
'criminal' involvement." Id at 49.
39. For the Court's general discussion of these rights, see 387 U.S. at 56-57. See also
Note, supra note 5, at 336.
40. See 387 U.S. at 36; see also supra note 20. "A proceeding where the issue is whether
the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution." 387 U.S. at 36.
41. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Winshtp involved a 12-year-old boy who was committed to a
reformatory for a period not to exceed six years, after being found guilty by a preponder-
ance of the evidence of stealing $122 from a woman's purse. Id
42. Id at 362; see also MINN. R. Juv. P. 27.05 (1984) (allegations in delinquency or
petty petition must be proved beyond reasonable doubt); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525-26 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 174 (1949); Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1914); Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881).
The reasonable doubt standard is required in both juvenile delinquency and adult
criminal proceedings to avoid convictions based on factual errors. 397 U.S. at 363-64.
43. 397 U.S. at 363. As in Gault, the Winship court disregarded the civil label to
effectuate this purpose. Id at 366.
19841
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tion by acknowledging that no one, adult or child, should be deemed
guilty unless there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
44
B. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Juvenile Has No Constitutional Right
to a Juy
In view of the Supreme Court's established cases, and its progressive
expansion of juvenile constitutional safeguards, the 1971 decision in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania45 emerged as an archaic anomaly. McKeiver was
the consolidation of two juvenile cases46 in which appellants were denied
jury trials and subsequently adjudicated delinquent.47 The sole issue
presented to the Court was "whether the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment assures the right to a trial by jury in the adjudicative
phase of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding."4 8 In a plurality
opinion, the Supreme Court held that the juveniles did not have the con-
stitutional right to trial by jury,49 as the jury trial was not needed to
ensure fundamental fairness.50
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Blackmun and joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White, recognized that
"the fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early
reformers . . . [have] not been realized." 5 1 The Court stated:
44. Id. at 364.
45. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
46. Joseph McKeiver and Edward Terry were the juveniles in the first of the consoli-
dated cases. McKeiver, 16, was adjudged a delinquent after being charged with robbery,
larceny, and receipt of stolen goods. Id at 534-35. McKeiver was placed on probation.
He requested a jury trial, which was denied. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania af-
firmed. Id at 535. Terry, 15, was adjudged a delinquent on charges of assault and battery
and conspiracy. Like McKeiver, Terry requested and was denied a trial by jury. Terry
was committed to a "Youth Development Center." The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed. Id The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania consolidated these two cases, and then
determined that there was no constitutional right to a trial by jury in juvenile court. An
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. at 535-36.
The second case involved Barbara Burrus and approximately 45 other black children,
ages 11-15. These children, except one, were charged with "wilfully impeding traffic," a
misdemeanor offense. Id. at 536-37. Each child, represented by the same lawyer, re-
quested and was denied a jury trial. Id at 537. Each child was then declared a delin-
quent and committed to the County Department of Public Welfare for an undetermined
period of time. Id at 537-38. These commitments were suspended by the court, and each
child was placed on probation. Id at 538.
The two cases were consolidated, and the United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari. Id
47. Id
48. Id at 530.
49. See id. at 545.
50. See id. at 545-51.
51. Id at 543-44; see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
YOUTH CRIME 7-10 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. The task force
[Vol. 10
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Too often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart, pro-
tective, and communicating figure the system envisaged. The commu-
nity's unwillingness to provide people and facilities and to be
concerned, the insufficiency of time devoted, the scarcity of professional
help, the inadequacy of dispositional alternatives, and our general lack
of knowledge all contribute to our dissatisfaction with the
experiment.
5 2
Despite these recognized shortcomings in the system, the Court con-
cluded that jury trials for juveniles were not constitutionally mandated
to ensure fundamental fairness in the juvenile process. 53 Justice Black-
mun opined that the jury is not a "necessary component of accurate
factfinding" 54 and a juvenile may be treated as fairly by a judge as by a
jury. Nonetheless, the Court expressed doubts about the qualifications
and possible partiality of juvenile court judges.
55
The McKeiver Court was concerned that the institution of juvenile jury
trials would mandate removal of the civil label from delinquency pro-
ceedings.56 By maintaining the civil label, opined the Court, the juvenile
system would be better able to preserve the desired aspects of fairness,
concern, and parental attention traditionally deemed inherent in the ju-
venile court.5 7 The Justices were also concerned that use of the jury trial
could turn juvenile proceedings into a "fully adversary process and . . .
put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an inti-
mate, informal protective proceeding."58 Thus, although the Court rec-
ognized that the ideal juvenile system had not been realized, it was
unwilling to extend to juveniles the constitutional protection of a trial by
jury. The McKeiver Court warned that imposition of a jury would bring
with it "the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adver-
sary system, and possibly, the public trial."59 "Meager as has been the
also noted that the juvenile court judge is often not the protective, sympathetic, and quali-
fied person the juvenile system envisioned. Id
52. 403 U.S. at 544.
53. Id at 545.
54. Id at 543. The Court stated that "we have been content to pursue other ways
(e.g. the judge) for determining facts." Id;see also George,supra note 5, at 327 (suggesting
that jury of adults may be harsher and more arbitrary than judge). But see Note, Juveniles
and Their Right to aJuv Trod, 15 VILL. L. REV. 972, 994 (1970).
55. See 403 U.S. at 544.
56. See id at 550.
57. Set id
58. Id. at 545.
59. Id at 550. Several articles discuss the feasibility of a public trial for juveniles. See,
e.g., Cohen, Reconciling Media Access with Confdent'ality for the Individual in Juvenile Court, 20
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 405 (1980); Czajkoski, Why Confidentiality ofJuven'leJustice, 33 Juv.
& FAM. CT. J., Nov. 1982, at 49; Jonas, Press Access to the Juvenile Courtroom.'Juvenile Anonym-
ity and the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 287 (1982); McIntyre, Juvenile
Court Proceedings. The Confyict Between Juvenile Anonymity and Freedom of Press, 23 S. TEX. L.J.
383 (1982); McNulty, Ftist Amendment versus Sixth Amendment: A Constitutional Battle in the
Juvenile Courts, 10 N.M.L. REV. 311 (1980).
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hoped-for advance in the juvenile field, the alternative [jury trial] would
be regressive, would lose what has been gained, and would tend once
again to place the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal pro-
cess. '"60 The paucity of states using jury trials in delinquency proceed-
ings bolstered the Court's decision.6 1 The Court stated:
The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not
conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due
process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the
practice 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'
6 2
The Court in McKeiver did not bar jury trials for juveniles. Rather, the
Justices encouraged states to experiment with various juvenile systems in
their search for an ideal process.63 They stated, "There is, of course,
nothing to prevent a juvenile court judge, in a particular case where he
feels the need, or when the need is demonstrated, from using an advisory
jury."
Justice White concurred with the McKeiver holding and filed a sepa-
rate opinion. He emphasized that delinquency actions were not "crimi-
nal," 6 5 distinguishing the proceedings on the basis that "criminal law
proceeds on the theory that defendants have a will and are responsible
for their actions. ' '66 On the other hand, "Reprehensible acts by juveniles
are not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent choice but of
environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their
control. ' '67 Justice White saw a vast difference between the consequences
60. 403 U.s. at 547.
61. Id at 548.
62. Id
63. Id at 547.
64. Id. at 548. Duluth, Minnesota has implemented such a system. See infra notes
155-62 and accompanying text; cf Arthur, Should Children Be As Equal As People?, 45
N.D.L. REV. 204, 214-15 (1969) (children cannot be jurors for other children and the
judge is the peer for the child).
65. 403 U.S. at 551.
66. Id
67. Id at 551-52. Another commentator states:
The causes of juvenile delinquency were believed to be the result of juvenile
ignorance, naivety or inadvertence, inadequate family parenting or a crime and
vice-ridden environment. As a result, instead of placing blame and punishing
the guilty, like criminal court judges, juvenile court judges were to be non-judg-
mental and determine suitable treatment methods.
Kittle, supra note 7, at 93. Even if this is true, some commentators believe there is little
that society can do to remedy the problem:
If a child is delinquent because his family made him so or his friends encouraged
him to be so, it is hard to conceive what society might do about this. No one
knows how a government might restore affection, stability, and fair discipline to
a family that rejects these characteristics; still less can one imagine how even a
family once restored could affect a child who.by now has left the formative years
and in any event has developed an aversion to one or both of his parents.
J. WILSON, COMMENTARY, CRIME AND THE CRIMINOLOGISTS 47-48 (1974).
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of misconduct by juveniles and by adults. He stated that there was "a
substantial gulf between criminal guilt and delinquency .... "68 He
feared that jury trials would leave states free to "embrace condemnation,
punishment, and deterrence as permissible and desirable attributes of the
juvenile justice system." 6
9
Justice Brennan also concurred with the result in McKeiver, 70 stating
that the due process clause of the sixth and fourteenth amendments com-
pels "not a particular procedure. . .[but only] fundamental fairness." 7 1
He perceived that public scrutiny of the juvenile legal process then effec-
tive in Pennsylvania's juvenile courts 72 provided fundamental fairness,
and, therefore, a jury trial was not required.7 3
Justices Douglas, Black, and Marshall dissented.74 Justice Douglas be-
lieved that states were required to extend jury trials to juveniles under
the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment.75 He stated:
[W]here a State uses its juvenile court proceedings to prosecute a juve-
nile for a criminal act and to order 'confinement' until the child
reaches 21 years of age or where the child at the threshold of the pro-
ceedings faces that prospect, then he is entitled to the same procedural
protection as an adult. 76
The dissenters also emphasized that the fourteenth amendment refers to
denial of rights to "any person," not "any adult person." 77 Finding the
68. 403 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added).
69. Id (emphasis added); c.f infra note 87 and accompanying text (Minnesota now
uses condemnation, punishment, and deterrence in treatment of juvenile offenders).
Justice White believed that since the juvenile proceedings were not labeled criminal,
they did not require a jury. 403 U.S. at 551. Now, however, Minnesota's statute is crimi-
nal in effect. See infta note 87 and accompanying text. Therefore, according to Justice
White's concurring opinion, Minnesota courts should now be employing jury trials for
juveniles in delinquency proceedings. See 403 U.S. at 551.
70. 403 U.S. at 553.
71. Id at 554.
72. Id at 555-56.
73. Id at 554-55. McKei'ver was commenced in Pennsylvania, where juvenile trials
were open to the public. Justice Brennan indicated that the public scrutiny of the juvenile
process was sufficient to meet the burden of "fundamental fairness." See id.
74. Id at 557.
75. Id at 558.
76. Id at 559.
77. Id at 560. In comparison, the Minnesota Constitution, article I, section 4 states:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at
law without regard to the amount in controversy. Ajury trial may be waived by
the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law; and the legislature may
provide that the agreements of five-sixths of a jury in a civil action or proceed-
ing, after not less than six (6) hours' deliberation, shall be a sufficient verdict
therein.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4. Article I, section 6 provides that the defendants in criminal
cases receive "a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... " Id § 6. Section 4
does not use the word "person," rather it mandates the jury trial in "all cases at law."
This would appear to include juveniles. Those who insist on labeling juvenile proceedings
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difference between the treatment ofjuvenile and adult criminal offenders
to be minimal,78 the dissenters applied a literal interpretation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Finding support from a lower court opinion in which a juvenile was
granted a jury trial,79 the dissenting Justices agreed that the right to a
jury trial would engender rehabilitation and respect for the juvenile
court system. 80 Under their view, the advent of the jury trial would be a
positive step toward the ultimate goal of juvenile rehabilitation.
C State Experimentation After McKeiver
The McKeiver decision prompted many state courts and legislatures to
experiment with their juvenile systems. Today, twelve years after Mc-
Keiver, sixteen states provide juveniles involved in delinquency proceed-
ings the right to a trial by jury. Eleven states provide an absolute right to
ajury trial,81 while the remaining five qualify that right.8 2 Although the
civil, irrespective of the criminal effect, may claim that juvenile proceedings are outside
the purview of section 6 because it applies only to criminal prosecutions.
78. The Court noted that "[c]onviction of each of the crimes [perpetrated by the
juveniles] would subject a person, whether juvenile or adult, to imprisonment in a state
institution." 403 U.S. at 558 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Justices also cited with ap-
proval Justice Black's statement in Gault that: "[I]t would be a plain denial of equal
protection of the laws-an invidious discrimination-to hold that others subject to heavier
punishments could, because they are children, be denied these same constitutional safe-
guards." Id at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 61).
79. Id. at 562 (citing In re McCloud, an unpublished opinion by Judge DeCiantis of
the Family Court of Providence, Rhode Island). Judge DeCiantis wrote:
The child who feels that he has been dealt with fairly and not merely expedi-
ently or as speedily as possible will be a better prospect for rehabilitation ....
Traumatic experiences of denial of basic rights only accentuate the past depriva-
tion and contribute to the problem. Thus, a general societal attitude of accept-
ance of a juvenile as a person entitled to the same protection as an adult may be
the true beginning of the rehabilitative process.
Id. at 562 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 708 (juvenile jury
trials would lend proceedings air of dignity and assure juvenile that case had been thought
through thoroughly).
80. See 403 U.S. at 560; see also infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
81. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1983); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-106(4) (1978);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 55A (West 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 712A.17(2) (West 1968); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-521(1) (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1-31(A) (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1110 (West 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 54.03(c) (Vernon 1982); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.31(2) (West 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-223(c) (1977).
82. In Tennessee, a child who commits an act which would be a felony if committed
by an adult is entitled to a jury trial. Arwood v. State, 62 Tenn. App. 453, 458, 463
S.W.2d 943, 946 (1970). Indiana provides for a juvenile jury trial if the child is subject to
placement in a public hospital or incarceration with adults. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-7-
10(c) (West 1979).
The juvenile court judge is granted discretion to permit juvenile jury trials in Ala-
bama, Kansas, and South Dakota. Exparte State ex retl. Simpson, 288 Ala. 535, 537, 263
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right to a trial by jury has long been labeled fundamental for adults,83
there clearly has been reluctance to recognize the same right for children.
To some extent, Minnesota has experimented with its juvenile justice
system as encouraged by the Justices in McKeiver. 84 In 1980, the Minne-
sota Legislature amended the purpose clause of the Juvenile Court Act.
8 5
The amendment constituted a significant shift in policy. The original
purpose of the Act was:
to secure for each minor under the jurisdiction of the court the care
and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the spiritual,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best in-
terests of the state; to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties
whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only
when his welfare or safety and protection of the public cannot be ade-
quately safeguarded without removal; and, when the minor is removed
from his own family, to secure for him custody, care and discipline as
nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by
his parents. The laws relating to juvenile courts shall be liberally con-
strued to carry out these purposes.
8 6
The benevolent language of the original clause presents a stark contrast
to the severity of the amended version, which provides in relevant part:
The purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to
be delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delin-
quency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting
certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful
behavior. This purpose should be pursued through means that are fair
and just, that recognize the unique characteristics of children, and that
give children access to opportunities for personal and social growth.8 7
Comparison of the two clauses demonstrates that Minnesota has
shifted the primary emphasis of its entire juvenile system from rehabilita-
tion to punishment, aligning it with the adult criminal system. Along
with the shift in purpose of the law has come harsher, systematic criminal
treatment of juvenile offenders.88 Having eliminated the civil-criminal
justification for withholding the right, Minnesota should now provide
So. 2d 137, 138 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808(a) (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 26-8-31 (1976).
83. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, reh'g denid, 392 U.S. 947 (1968). "[Tlrial
by jury is fundamental to the American scheme of justice .... ." 391 U.S. at 149. The
right to a trial by jury is a fundamental right and must be recognized by states as part of,
their obligation to extend the process of law to all persons within their jurisdiction. The
right to a jury trial is extended in order to prevent oppression by the government. Id The
jury trial demonstrates "a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of
the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges." Id at 156.
84. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
85. Act of April 15, 1980, ch. 580, § 3, 1980 Minn. Laws 966 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 260.011 (1982)).
86. MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 1 (1978) (repealed 1980).
87. Id § 260.011, subd. 2 (1982).
88. See supra note 1.
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juveniles the right to trial by jury. The juvenile should no longer be
regarded essentially as a non-person8 9 with meager constitutional rights.
III. THE RATIONALE FOR JUVENILE JURY TRIALS IN MINNESOTA
A. Criminal Treatment ofjuveniles in Mnnesota
Juvenile proceedings are labeled "civil," a fact which has been soundly
criticized.9 0 The label does not eradicate the criminal effect of the pro-
ceedings. As one court stated, "While the juvenile court law provides
that adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the court shall not be
deemed to be conviction of a crime, . . . for all practical purposes, this is
a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to
reason."91
The majority of jurisdictions have been hesitant to dismiss the civil
label.92 They cling to the rehabilitative ideal, 93 demonstrating a reluc-
89. See A. PLATT, supra note 6, at 160. "The benelovent philosophy of the juvenile
court often disguises the fact that the offender is regarded as a 'non-person' who is imma-
ture, unworldly, and incapable of making effective decisions with regard to his own wel-
fare and future." Id
90. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Court disregarded civil label to effec-
tuate goal of proof beyond reasonable doubt); In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789,
241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952) (referred to the civil label as "legal fiction"); Peyton v. Nord, 78
N.M. 717, 724, 437 P.2d 716, 723 (1968) (although civil label attaches, juvenile actually
treated as criminal); Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650, 652 (T'ex. Civ. App. 1968) (juvenile
may be subject to loss of liberty, thus treatment is criminal, not civil). See generally Com-
ment, supra note 5, at 816 (civil label merely used to avoid constitutional protections af-
forded in criminal proceedings).
91. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952).
92. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 540-42 (civil label appropriate
because treating juvenile as criminal contradicts objectives of juvenile court system);
United States v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 902, 904 (D. Ariz. 1974) (juvenile delinquency not a
crime, but a status); In re Elmore, 222 A.2d 255, 258 (D.C. App. 1966) (juvenile proceed-
ing must be "far removed from the characteristics of a criminal trial"); Arizona State
Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249, 196 P.2d 298 (1956); In re Dargo, 81 Cal.
App. 2d 205, 207, 183 P.2d 282, 283 (1947) (juvenile court proceedings not of criminal
nature and do not carry same public stigma); Exparte Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 325, 228 P.
467, 469 (1924) (juvenile proceedings considered "special" in nature); Brooks v. Taylor, 51
Del. 583, 590-91, 150 A.2d 188, 192-93, afd, 52 Del. 138, 154 A.2d 386 (1959) (compared
civil nature of rehabilitation with criminal nature of punishment); Exparte Kitts, 109 Fla.
202, 205, 147 So. 573, 575 (1933) (juvenile courts have no jurisdiction to determine guilt);
Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 379-80, 254 N.E.2d 319, 321 (1970) (juvenile proceeding non-
criminal in nature); In re Johnson, 267 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1977) (emphasized keeping dis-
tance between juvenile and criminal proceedings); Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d
457, 461 (Ky. 1968) (juvenile proceeding not criminal); Wheeler v. Shoemake, 213 Miss.
374, 57 So. 2d 267 (1952); State ex ret. Palagi v. Freeman, 81 Mont. 132, 262 P.2d 503
(1943); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 151, 138 P.2d 503, 510 (1943) (delinquency pro-
ceeding civil not criminal); In re Hans, 174 Neb. 612, 615, 119 N.W.2d 72, 74-75 (1963)
(distinction between delinquency and crime); State ex re. Miller v. Bryant, 94 Neb. 754,
144 N.W. 804 (1913) (juvenile law not criminal in nature); In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276,
277, 184 A.2d 449, 450 (1962) (adjudication of delinquency distinct from criminal guilt);
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tance to scrutinize their juvenile proceedings, or perhaps merely fearing
Exparte Newkosky, 94 NJ.L. 314, 315, 116 A. 716, 716 (1920) (juvenile proceedings "save
young persons from the ordinary punishment for crime"); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171,
172, 183 N.E. 353, 354 (1932) (juvenile proceedings not criminal in nature); In re Agler, 19
Ohio St. 2d 70, 80, 249 N.E.2d 808, 811 (1969) (civil label used to protect juveniles from
answerability of adult criminals); Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St. 475, 477, 196 N.E.2d
457, 458 (1964) (juvenile courts are civil not criminal); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 603, 109
A.2d 523, 525 (1954) (purpose of law protective not penal); Yzaguirre v. State, 427 S.W.2d
687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Duboise, 604 F.2d 648, 650 (10th Cir. 1979) (purpose of
juvenile justice system is removing juveniles from criminal process which allows them to
be treated rather than punished); United States v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 902, 905 (D. Ariz.
1974) (delinquents not punished, but led away from life of crime); Prince v. State, 19 Ala.
App. 495, 98 So. 320 (1923); In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 207, 183 P.2d 282, 283
(1947) (proceedings similar to guardianship, with opportunity for supervision, corrective
care, and training); People v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 276, 282, 285 P. 871, 874
(1930) (juvenile court reformative rather than punitive); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121
A. 678 (1923); Brooks v. Taylor, 51 Del. 583, 589, 150 A.2d 188, 192, aj'd, 52 Del. 138, 154
A.2d 386 (1959) (purpose to assist juveniles overcome antisocial tendencies); In re Elmore,
222 A.2d 255, 258 (D.C. App. 1966) (directed to status and needs of child, far removed
from criminal trial); People ex re. Carey v. White, 65 Ill. 2d 193, 199, 357 N.E.2d 512, 515
(1976) (protection of minors enhanced by not allowing a jury trial); Welfare of J.E.C. v.
State, 302 Minn. 387, 401, 225 N.W.2d 245, 253-54 (1975) (entire purpose of juvenile act is
rehabilitation of child before he becomes menace to society); Petersen v. McAuliffe, 151
Minn. 467, 469-70, 187 N.W. 226, 226-27 (1922) (purpose of juvenile court act not punish-
ment but welfare of delinquent child); State ex re. Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 357-58,
52 N.W. 935, 936 (1892) (child committed to reform school is not "punished" in ordinary
sense of word); Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928) (purpose of commit-
ment to reform school is not punitive but rehabilitative); State ex rel. Matacia v. Buckner,
300 Mo. 359, 254 S.W. 179 (1923) (purpose of act pertaining to delinquent children is not
trial and punishment but reformation); Laurie v. State, 108 Neb. 239, 188 N.W. 110
(1922) (commitment of child to reform school is not for purposes of punishment but for
guardianship, maintenance, and care and is not an interference with personal liberty re-
quiring trial by jury); In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 184 A.2d 449 (1962) (purpose of juve-
nile act protective, not punitive); In re Poulin, 100 N.H. 458, 129 A.2d 672 (1957) (juvenile
court proceedings are protective, not penal, and are designed to rehabilitate minors rather
than punish them); Ex parne Newkosky, 94 N.J.L. 314, 116 A. 716 (1920) (juvenile court
proceedings are not for punishment but are for reformation, education and parental care,
a substitute of public control for parental control); State v. Burnett, 179 N.C. 735, 102 S.E.
711 (1920); In re Watson, 157 N.C. 340, 351-55, 72 S.E. 1049, 1053-54 (1911) (state's power
to detain minor children justified only upon idea that child is without parental care and
state, as parens patr'ae, performs duty which devolves primarily on parent); In re Darnell,
173 Ohio St. 335, 337, 182 N.E.2d 321, 322 (1962) (child is committed to guardian of state
for proper care, reformation, and discipline); State v. Turner, 253 Or. 235, 241-42, 453
P.2d 910, 913 (1969) (ultimate question not guilt or innocence, but best interests of child);
In re Gomez, 113 Vt. 224, 225, 32 A.2d 138, 140 (1943) (statutory scheme relating to
delinquent children not penal but protective); State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d
772 (1979) (primary purpose rehabilitation of juvenile offender); Wisconsin Indus. School
for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651,664-65, 79 N.W. 422, 426-27 (1899) (proceeding to
commit child to "industrial school" is not a trial for an offense requiring a jury but a
statutory proceeding for the protection of the helpless). But see, e.g., A. PLATr, supra note
6, at 192. Professor Platt states:
[Ilt is impossible to conceive of the juvenile court system as an agency of 'rehabil-
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change. Today, however, "it has become clear that in fact the same pur-
poses that characterize the use of criminal law for adult offenders-retri-
bution, condemnation, deterrence, incapacitation-are involved in the
disposition of juvenile offenders too." 9 4
Although Minnesota has adopted the civil label for its juvenile pro-
ceedings, 95 its delinquency proceedings are now criminal in nature, as
evidenced by the current purpose clause of the Juvenile Court Act.96 A
referee for the Hennepin County Juvenile Court stated that the purpose
clause reflects a new "no-nonsense, get tough, . . . kick in the pants ap-
proach to recidivist, hard-core, and personal injury offenders."97 Minne-
sota no longer places primary emphasis on the best interests of the child,
but instead emphasizes public safety and protection.98 This reemphasis
made the statute criminal in effect. 99 Traditionally, the juvenile system
attempted to paternally guide the delinquent in making wiser choices
through rehabilitation rather than mere incarceration.100 Today, how-
ever, the statutory purpose emphasizes public safety and individual re-
sponsibility, rather than the former ideal of paternalistic care and
guidance. 10 1 Thus, the "substantial gulf" between delinquency and
crime perceived by Justice White in McKeiver 102 no longer exists in Min-
nesota.1 03 As Justice White feared, Minnesota now appears to "embrace
itation' and social equality in a society where most working-class and minority
youths are tracked into dead-end or low wage jobs, where institutional racism
and sexism systematically segment people into antagonistic social relations, and
where the criminal justice system is blatantly used to undermine and repress
progressive political movements.
Id See generaly, McLaughlin & Whisenand, Ju , Trial, Public Trial and Free Press in Juvenile
Proceedings: An Ana~sis and Comparison of the IJA/ABA, Task Force and NAC Standards, 46
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1979) (discussion of various rationales for denial of jury
trials in juvenile cases).
94. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 51, at 8.
95. See, e.g., Welfare of J.E.C. v. State, 302 Minn. 387, 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975); Peter-
sen v. McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 464, 187 N.W. 226 (1922); State ex rel Olson v. Brown, 50
Minn. 353, 52 N.W. 935 (1892). See generaly MINN. STAT. §§ 260.011-.301 (1982).
96. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
97. Haeg, Recent Developments in Juvenile Justie, HENNEPIN LAw., Nov.-Dec. 1980, at
21. Referee Haeg's reference was to Minnesota's 1980 Juvenile Justice Act. See id
98. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
99. Id.; see also Feld, supra note 5, at 203. "The new language of the purpose clause is
functionally indistinguishable from the language in the criminal code's purpose clause
.Id.
100. 403 U.S. at 552;cf A. PLATT, supra note 6, at 160. "The benevolent philosophy of
the juvenile court often disguises the fact that the offender is regarded as a 'non-person'
who is immature, unworldly, and incapable of making effective decisions with regard to
his own welfare and future." Id
101. See MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 1 (1982); supra notes 86-87 and accompanying
text.
102. 403 U.S. at 553.
103. For a discussion of this theory, see Response Memorandum In Support of Respon-
dent's Motion for Trial By Jury at 3-10, In the Matter of the Welfare of D.A.S., No.
90369-96 (Hennepin County Juv. Div. Minn. Oct. 31, 1980) (on file at William Mitchell
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condemnation, punishment and deterrence" in the treatment of juvenile
offenders. ,o4
A juvenile adjudicated delinquent in Minnesota is subject to nearly all
of the same procedures applied to an adult offender.10 5 The proceedings
yield essentially the same results. For example, the Gault Court recog-
nized that the stigmas attached to the labels of delinquent and criminal
are similar.106 Well-intentioned arguments have been advanced in an
attempt to create a "gulf" separating criminal and delinquency proceed-
ings: "taking a child into custody, rather than arresting him; placing
him in detention, rather than jail; . . . adjudication rather than findings
of guilt; disposition rather than sentencing; commitment, not incarcera-
tion; rehabilitation, not punishment."1o 7 Nonetheless, euphemisms can-
not change reality.108 A child taken into custody in Minnesotao9 is
subjected to a loss of liberty.'10 A juvenile adjudicated delinquent may
be detained against her will for a period of yearsII in an institution simi-
Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as Response Memorandum]. See also Stuart & Bush,
It's TimneforJuty Trials inJuvenile Court, 50 HENN. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 8-10. See gener-
ally Feld, supra note 5. Professor Feld states that "[m]aintaining the integrity of the sub-
stantive criminal law and developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior marks a
fundamental philosophical departure from the previous rehabilitative purpose of the juve-
nile justice system to much more explicity punitive and social control purposes." Id. at
192.
For the text of the earlier purpose of the Juvenile Court Act, see supra note 86 and
accompanying text. A comparison of the repealed and current statutes illustrates that
Minnesota has aligned its juvenile philosophy with that of its criminal statutes.
104. See 403 U.S. at 547.
105. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
107. Amicus Curiae Memorandum-Brief In Support of Respondent's Motion For
Trial By Jury at 12, In the Matter of the Welfare of D.A.S., No. 90369-96 (Hennepin
County Juv. Div. Minn. Oct. 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Mem-
orandum].
108. Id "[E]uphemistic and rhetorical language [has] not had the hoped-for effect of
changing the reality. The outcome for the juvenile on trial is real, and is not altered by or
dependent upon the label given the proceedings." Id
109. See MINN. R. Juv. P. 16 (1984) (standards and procedures to be followed in tak-
ing a child into custody). The rules use the phrase "immediate custody" rather than "ar-
rest." Id.
110. Rule 18 governs procedures to be followed in detention of a child. MINN. R. Juv.
P. 18 (1984). See generall In re Welfare of I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 87-88, 244 N.W.2d 30, 38-
39 (1976). The IQ.S. court was concerned with the juvenile defendant's unsuitability for
treatment. Through psychological testimony, it was determined that the juvenile needed
a high-security, yet rehabilitative facility. Id at 87-88, 244 N.W.2d at 38-39. Minnesota
presently does not have such a facility.
111. See MINN. STAT. § 242.44 (1982). The Juvenile Justice Agency Act states in part:
The commissioner of corrections, so far as the accommodations of the correc-
tional facilities and other means at the commissioner's disposal will permit, shall
receive and keep until they reach 19 years of age, or until placed in homes, or
discharged, all persons committed to his care and custody by a juvenile court.
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lar to an adult prison. t12
The array of dispositional alternatives tls available to the Minnesota
juvenile for rehabilitative purposes has been cited as demonstrating that
the system is not punitive in nature."14 These alternatives currently in-
clude counseling,11 5 probation,11 6 restitution,11 7 fines,1 8 specialized
treatment,"19 residential or nonresidential programs, 20 commitment to
the Commissioner of Corrections,121 and reference for adult prosecu-
tion. 122 Except reference for adult prosecution, each of these alternatives
is also available to the adult offender in some form.123
Id Consequently, the number of years a child is incarcerated may depend more on the
child's age at the time of the commitment than the severity of the offense.
112. See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 27. The Supreme Court stated:
It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practical meaning-that
the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact
of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a 'receiving home' or an
'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child
is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time.
Id
113. See MINN. STAT. § 260.185 (1982). The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted
the rehabilitative ideal. See, e.g., In re Welfare of Kelly Patrick Hartung, 304 N.W.2d 621
(Minn. 1981); In re Welfare of R.L.K. v. State, 269 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. 1978); In re Wel-
fare of I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976); see also Order and Memorandum, In
the Matter of the Welfare of D.A.S., No. 90369-96 (Hennepin County Juv. Div. Minn.
Jan. 26, 1981) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as Order
and Memorandum].
114. Memorandum In Opposition To Respondent's Motion for Trial By Jury at 7, In
the Matter of the Welfare of D.A.S., No. 90369-96 (Hennepin County Juv. Div. Minn.
Oct. 17, 1980) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as Memo-
randum In Opposition]. "A key determinant as to whether the juvenile system has be-
come criminal in nature is to examine the dispositional alternatives . Id
115. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.185, subd. l(a), 260.194(a) (1982).
116. Id §§ 260.185, subd. 1(b), 260.194, subd. l(b).
117. Id § 260.185, subd. l(e).
118. Id § 260.185, subd. 1(f) (juvenile may be ordered to pay a fine up to $500.00).
119. Id § 260.185, subd. l(g) (court may order special treatment for child).
120. Id § 260.185, subd. 1(c). Subdivision l(c) provides that the court may transfer
legal custody of the child to (1) a child placing agency, (2) the county welfare board, (3) a
reputable individual, or (4) a county home school. Id
121. Id § 260.185, subd. l(d); see also id § 242.19 (lists commissioner's powers over
delinquent child).
122. Id § 260.125.
123. Response Memorandum,supra note 103, at 5-6. Counseling for adults is provided
by Minnesota Statutes section 244.09, subdivision 5(2); transfer to a reputable person is
authorized under Minnesota Statutes section 609.135, subdivision 1. See MINN. STAT.
§§ 244.09, subd. 5(2), 609.135, subd. 1 (1982). The Response Memorandum notes the
"wide variety of community based residential programs such as Nexus, Freedom House,
Eden House, Portland House, Prodigal House, and Alpha House, as well as numerous
short-term chemical dependency programs" and refers to them as "the adult equivalent of
a child placing agency, the County Welfare Board, or the County Home School." Re-
sponse Memorandum, supra note 103, at 6.
Adults may also be committed to the Commissioner of Corrections for rehabilitation
and custody. MINN. STAT. § 241.01, subd. 3a(a) (1982). Adults may receive an order of
[Vol. lO
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The availability and method of reference of a juvenile for adult prose-
cution is a much debated area. 124 If a child waives trial as a juvenile in
favor of trial as an adult, 125 she is afforded the full panoply of adult
constitutional safeguards.12 6 Because of this possibility of waiver, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that "any child not wishing to
avail himself of such [juvenile court] treatment could certainly demand
his constitutional right to be, for example, tried by a jury."127 Thus, to
obtain a trial by jury in this manner, the juvenile must forfeit any shred
of special protection that the juvenile court may still have to offer. 128
Another example of the alignment of Minnesota's juvenile system with
the adult criminal process is the Minnesota Citizen's Council on Crime
and Justice's 29 draft of dispositional guidelines for anticipated imple-
mentation in Minnesota.13 0 The dispositional grid is strikingly similar to
the adult sentencing guidelines.13 1 Along with the semi-automatic refer-
restitution. Id. § 609.135, subd. 1. Adults may also be subjected to a fine without incar-
ceration. Id § 609.10(4). Adults may receive specialized treatment:
In the adult system, treatment can either be provided as a diversion alternative
such as Project de Novo, as a condition of probation, or as a part of a continu-
ance for dismissal. An adult defendant who, for example, needs treatment for
incest may be sent to the Family Renewal Program or the Center for Behavioral
Therapy as a disposition of his or her criminal case.
Response Memorandum, supra note 103, at 6.
124. See, e.g., In re Welfare of Kelly Patrick Hartung, 304 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 1981); In
re Welfare of S.R.J., 293 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 1980); In re Welfare of T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d
137 (Minn. 1980); In re Welfare of Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1979); In re Welfare of
J.B.M., 263 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 1978); State v. Duncan, 312 Minn. 17, 250 N.W.2d 189
(1977); In re Welfare of I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 244 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1976); In re Welfare of
J.E.C., 302 Minn. 387, 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975); State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 212
N.W.2d 664 (1973). See generally Feld, supra note 5.
125. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1982).
126. See In re Welfare of I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 87, 244 N.W.2d 30, 37 (1976).
127. Id
128. Id For a discussion of Minnesota's "get tough" references for prosecution and
arguments that such references evidence the criminal nature of the juvenile system, see
Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion For Trial By Jury at 1, In the Matter
of the Welfare of D.A.S., No. 90369-96 (Hennepin County Juv. Div. Minn. Oct. 6, 1980)
(on file at William Mitchell Law Review office) (refers to Minnesota reference procedures
as "semiautomatic" and "punitive"); Response Memorandum, supra note 103, at 7 (points
to "semiautomatic" certification as evidencing legislature's "intent to bring punishment
into the juvenile system"); Stuart & Bush, supra note 103, at 8. But see Order and Memo-
randum, supra note 113, at 3 (Judge Oleisky presents both sides of the argument); Memo-
randum in Opposition, supra note 114, at 10 (argues that reference is not "semi-
automatic"); Baez, Jug Trials In Juvenile Courts. A Prosecutor's Perspective, HENNEPIN LAW.,
Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 16. See generally, Feld, supra note 5 (includes in-depth discussion of adult
certification procedures in Minnesota).
129. Formerly the Correctional Service of Minnesota.
130. See MINNESOTA CITIZENS COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT
DISPOSITIONAL GUIDELINES: HANDBOOK FOR ADVISORY SANCTION LEVELS (second pilot
draft in a continuing effort, October 1982) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office)
[hereinafter cited as DISPOSITIONAL GUIDELINES].
131. Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 244.01-.11 (1982) with DISPOSITIONAL GUIDELINES,
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ral for adult prosecution,132 the inherent rigidity of the juvenile disposi-
tional guidelines indicates a trend toward increased criminal treatment
of juvenile offenders in Minnesota.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also recently adopted a set of uni-
form juvenile court rules.133 Associate Justice Scott of the Minnesota
Supreme Court has recognized that:
The adoption of the Uniform Rules of Juvenile Procedure in Minne-
sota presents the stark realization that we have swung from the philoso-
supra note 130. The Dispositional Guidelines attempt to create less severe sanctions for
juveniles than adults. See DIsPOSITIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 130, at 1 (statement of
philosophy). Following is the list of principles which "guided the development" of the
guidelines:
1. Separation of sanction and treatment decisions.
2. Sanctions which are neutral with respect to race, color, national origin,
religion, sex, handicap, socioeconomic or family status.
3. Sanctions proportional in severity to the severity of the current offense
and offense history.
4. Sanctions which place greater emphasis on current offense than on of-
fense history.
5. Less severe sanctions than those for adults.
6. Accountability for behavior without unnecessary use of institutionaliza-
tion or unnecessarily severe fines, work orders, or time on probation.
7. Discretion in unique situations.
8. Structured individualization including choice of sanctions.
9. Ease of use.
10. Maximal involvement of practitioners in development and testing.
Id
The October 1982 grid of "Advisory Sanction Levels" is appended to this Note. Dur-
ing testing of the draft, the results will be reviewed by the Council to ensure that juvenile
sanctions are not harsher than adult sanctions would be. Id at iii. The Advisory Sanc-
tions "are not treatment or program specific," and the needs of the juvenile are to be
considered. Id. at iv. The abbreviation of "DOC" on the grid stands for the Department
of Corrections, used to indicate where commitment is recommended. Id at v.
Like the adult sentencing guidelines, departures are expected, but at a higher rate.
Therefore, the Council has appended a non-exhaustive list of mitigating and aggravating
factors to the grid. These include:
1. age at the time of offense
2. lapse of time between the current offense and previous delinquent be-
havior
3. mitigating and aggravating factors surrounding previous offenses
4. performance while under previous court orders (this should be mea-
sured against the adequacy of service provided during such court orders)
5. previous traffic violations (if related to current offense)
6. whether, in the case of both current and previous misdemeanors, the
act was a gross misdemeanor as provided by law
7. number and nature of previous court diversions and continuances (if
they resulted from clearly documented delinquent behavior)
8. number of days in detention prior to the disposition
9. attempts or conspiracies
10. any factors applicable to a juvenile which appear in the adult sentenc-
ing guidelines departure policy
Id at v.
132. &e supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
133. MINN. R. Juv. P. (effective May 1, 1983).
[Vol. 10
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phy that originally created our juvenile court system, based upon a
benevolent and less formal means of dealing with the special and often
sensitive problems of youthful offenders, to what Chief Justice Burger
described as . . . 'the trappings of legal procedure and judicial
[formalism].
' 3 4
With this realization must come the extension of adult due process rights,
as the juvenile in Minnesota is essentially subject to the same legal pro-
cess as an adult, with the exception of the jury trial and open trial. 135
Although the juvenile offender in Minnesota receives additional pro-
tections while undergoing a delinquency adjudication,136 those shades of
protection pale in comparison to the similarities between juvenile and
adult procedures. Neither the civil label of the proceedings' 3 7 nor the
availability of rehabilitative dispositional alternatives, also available to
adults, 38 is a sufficient distinguishing factor on which to base a denial of
the fundamental right to trial by jury.' 3 9 When special protections af-
forded juveniles "have been so eroded away that what is actually a pun-
ishment is characterized as a treatment, an abuse of constitutional
dimension has occurred, and, a jury trial is required before punishment
• . .may be inflicted." 14  Nevertheless, 64.7% of Minnesota's juvenile
court judges responding to a 1981 survey agreed with the statement:
"Punishment is a morally desirable goal for the juvenile justice
system."141
134. Scott, The New Uniform Juvenile Court Rules.- Milestones or Moonbeams?, in THE NEW
UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT RULES 41, 43 (A.L.E. Hamline U. School L. 1983) (citing In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
135. See generally supra note 123 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., MINN. R. Juv. P. 8, 34 (1984) (confidentiality of hearings and court
records); id at 18 (court review of continued detention; restriction of photographs). Addi-
tionally, juvenile proceedings for children in custody are generally conducted more quick-
ly than their adult counterparts.
137. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 43, 52.
140. In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 370, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1978).
141. Kittle, supra note 7, at 97. In 1981, a written survey was sent to the 110 county
court judges in Minnesota. Seventy-eight of those judges (68%) responded to the survey.
Four judges sent the survey back unanswered because they handled no juvenile court
matters. The total number of judges answering the survey was 71 (64%). Id.
In response to the statement, "Punishment is a morally desirable goal for the juvenile
court system," the answers were as follows:
Strongly Agree 10 (14.0%)
Agree 36 (50.7%)
No opinion 7 (10.0%)
Disagree 14 (20.3%)
Strongly Disagree 1 (2.0%)
No response 3 (4.2%)
Id Interestingly, Minnesota judges were chosen specifically for this study because of the
state's "reputation for compassion, governmental innovation and progressive corrections
system." Id After receiving the results of the survey, however, Professor Kittle stated that
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The civil label cannot eradicate the criminal effect of Minnesota's pu-
nitive treatment of juvenile offenders. Since the juvenile offender in
Minnesota is now processed through a system which effectively treats her
as a criminal, the jury trial should be available as a necessary component
of due process.
B Judge Versus jury
Courts have often stated that a juvenile jury trial is not necessary be-
cause the judge is an adequate, fair, and competent fact-finder.14 2 In
many cases, this is assuredly true. It is not always possible, however, for
even the most conscientious judge to maintain impartiality.143 Without
a jury, the judge is vested with almost unlimited discretionary powers,
and is susceptible of taking an individualistic approach to the daily
caseload.14 4 Total impartiality is impossible when the judge is faced
with a recidivist juvenile.145 The juvenile court judge rules on the admis-
sibility of evidence, 146 and it is unrealistic to assume that the judge can
ignore a piece of evidence after ruling it inadmissible.147 "Such concen-
tration of power substantially refutes the fundamental decision of our
forebearers that the life and liberty of a citizen should not be entrusted to
one judge." 148 A sole judge is insufficient in the juvenile system. The
these results were "a most interesting and surprising response in an ostensibly treatment-
oriented system." Id
142. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 547 (jury trial would not
strengthen fact-finding function); United States v. Duboise, 604 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1979)
(jury not a necessary component of accurate fact finding); Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435
S.W.2d 457, 461 (Ky. 1968) ("cannot regard ajury as a better, fairer, more accurate fact-
finder than a competent and conscientious circuit judge"); Commonwealth v. Johnson,
211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967) (jury would not contribute to fact-finding function of
court). See generally George;supra note 5, at 326-27 (suggests jury may be harsher and more
arbitrary than a judge); Note, supra note 54, at 994.
143. See Stuart & Bush, supra note 103, at 9. Stuart and Bush state that:
[A] juvenile court judge often follows the development of a juvenile respondent
and his or her family for several years. This familiarity is a tremendous asset
when a case reaches the disposition stage; however, it is not the sort of knowledge
appropriate for the trier of fact to have in reaching a verdict on a specific charge.
Id
144. See McLaughlin & Whisenand, supra note 93, at 3. The individual "value systems
of juvenile court judges are most crucial because such value systems are important factors
when judges carry out their judicial function." Kittle, supra note 7, at 96.
145. Kittle, supra note 7, at 96; see also supra note 126.
146. See MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 1 (1982).
147. See Stuart & Bush, supra note 103, at 9. Because the jury does not hear evidence
excluded by the judge, it is never put in the position of being impartial after hearing an
inadmissible piece of evidence. Id
148. McLaughlin & Whisenand, supra note 93, at 3. These authors state:
The right to trial by jury was granted to juveniles early in this nation's history.
Even after the reform movement directed toward the means of juvenile delin-
quents began in the late 1800's, major juvenile offenders were prosecuted in
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goal of an adequate, fair, and competent fact-finder may be less attaina-
ble when a referee, who is not a trained attorney or judge, hears the
case. 149
The jury plays an important role in the legal process, and is needed for
several well-known, oft-repeated reasons: to prevent oppression by gov-
ernment; 150 to protect against the "corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge;"sI to buffer the
wide discretionary power granted the judge; 52 to check dishonesty or
partiality within the system; and basically, to make findings of fact which
are fair, disregarding outdated legal concepts. 153 Juries are deeply
rooted in our nation's legal heritage.154 Juries were created to make fair
findings of fact, and our legal system embraces them for that purpose.
Duluth has instituted a system providing juvenile offenders a hearing
before a jury of peers-volunteeer high school students. 155 Juvenile de-
fendants who have admitted the charge 156 participate voluntarily.157
The defendant may at any time choose to stop the jury proceeding and
be heard before a judge.158 The jurors hear a variety of misdemeanor
cases 159 and make disposition recommendations. 16 If the defendant ob-
jects to the disposition reached, she may withdraw and receive a judicial
Id (footnotes omitted). Seegenerally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (history of
trial by jury); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8 (1966); Comment, supra
note 5, at 835-38; Case Comment, supra note 5, at 256-63.
149. MINN. STAT. § 260.031, subd. 1 (1982). See generally Stuart, supra note 9, at 80-89
(function of referees in Minnesota's juvenile courts). Referees may hear juvenile cases in
Minnesota. MINN. STAT. § 260.031 (1982). "The judge may direct that any case or class
of cases shall be heard in the first instance by the referee in the manner provided for the
hearing of cases by the court." Id § 260.031, subd. 2. In Hennepin County, for example,
they hear the majority of cases. See infia note 167 and accompanying text.
150. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 156.
151. Comment, supra note 5, at 836 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 156).
152. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 156; f Kittle, supra note 7, at 94 (judges may
espouse rehabilitative values while actually practicing crime control values). The judge
may, however, be less punitive than a panel of adult jurors. See George, supra note 5, at
327; cf Arthur, supra note 64, at 214 (suggests juvenile jury trial not trial by one's peers as
required by Constitution because children are not jurors).
153. Comment, supra note 5, at 837. "The threat ofjudicial abuse in the juvenile court
is real, and juries can be expected to buffer that problem." Id.
154. See supra notes 77, 83.
155. DULUTH YOUTH COUNCIL, YOUTH JURY: A REPORT (June 1981) (on file at Wil-
liam Mitchell Law Review office). The jury runs for the nine month school year. Each
board of jurors is randomly selected from the applicants and comprises a board of 14
jurors (the median number of attending is 10). The jurors hear cases one day per week for
four hours and serve for three weeks. Id at 2.
156. Id The juvenile defendants are each first-time offenders. Id
157. Id at 3.
158. Id at 4.
159. The jurors hear misdemeanor criminal damage to property, vandalism, theft, as-
sault, possession of marijuana and alcohol, and game violation offenses. Id at 38. The
actual frequency of cases heard is as follows:
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Shoplifting 27%
Consumption of Alcohol 15.4%
Possession of Marijuana 33.6%










160. Id. at 38. The jurors actively participate in the process, contrary to adult court.
Jurors also question the defendant and use the responses in their deliberations. The fol-
lowing is a list of suggested questions and possible sentences given to prospective jurors:
1. How have your grades been in school up to this point.
2. What did your parents say and do when the Police brought you home on
the night of the arrest.
3. Do you have many friends at school.
4. Do your parents approve of your friends.
5. How do you and your parents get along.
6. Do you consider drinking by a person under age to be wrong.
7. Do you consider the smoking of marijuana to be wrong.
8. Do you feel that you should be punished for breaking the law.
9. How long have you been drinking, smoking marijuana, shoplifting, bur-
glarizing houses, staying out late at night and other assorted acts.
10. Do you feel your acts are excusable because you are drunk or otherwise
intoxicated.
11. What was your reaction when you were arrested by the Police.
12. Did you do what you did to be accepted by a group of people or to be liked
more by your friends.
13. What do you feel would be a satisfactory punishment for the crime you
have been charged and admitted guilt to.
Remember that the questions you ask as a jury are the only means of determin-
ing what sentence should be given to this person for the act that they have con-
fessed guilt to.
LIST OF POSSIBLE SENTENCES
1. 0-90 days of probation (supervised or unsupervised): supervision means
that the student case worker can request that the individual meet with
them on a regular basis and unsupervision means that for all intents and
purposes the individual does not have to report to anyone during his/her
probation period.
2. 0-96 hours of community service work; community service work is free work
that the individual will give to a private, non-profit agency in the city of
Duluth.
3. Parents and youth drug awareness education, PAYDAE, this is a drug edu-
cation program run by the Center on Alcohol and Drug Problems and you
can sentence the individual and parents to attend these sessions which oc-
cur twice in a two week period.
4. You can assign a volunteer in corrections to the individual, this is similar to
a Big Brother or Big Sister Program, use your [judgment] in assigning
volunteers.
5. You can require that the individual apologize either in writing or in person
to the manager of a store where they were caught shoplifting or to an indi-
vidual that they may have hurt in the course of what they were doing or an
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decision. 161 According to the Duluth City Council, the system is a suc-
cess.1 62 The system is certainly more informal than adult court; no find-
ings of fact are made and the defendant receives a sentence truly
determined by her peers.
The age of jurors in comparison to the age of defendants should not be
6. You can assess monetary restitution for a crime, such as: if they break win-
dows, destroy front lawns, break up something, steal something that is irre-
placeable, or [lose] something that they have stolen.
Id at 49-50. The Juvenile Court Judge has also created a list of guidelines for hours of
community service work:
8-16 Consumption and [drugs] (First Offense).
24-32 Theft, depending if First Offense.
32-40 Burglary, depending on record.
60-120+ - Assault
? Criminal Damage to Property






































161. Id at 4.
162. Id at 1.
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a decisive factor for denial ofjuvenile jury trials. If the Minnesota Legis-
lature were to implement jury trials, the peers would most likely be
adults.I6 3 In Minnesota, any person over the age of eighteen may, under
appropriate circumstances, serve as a juror.164 The word peer has never
been so stringently defined as to include only persons of precisely the
same age as the accused.' 65 Certainly peers would include persons older
than the defendant, just as in adult criminal court.I 66
The hoped-for educated, impartial judge envisioned by the juvenile
court system cannot always be present. 16 7 Therefore, the decision to
have a jury in any given juvenile case should be left to the lawyer, client,
and other interested parties. With the exception of the Duluth system,
the judge, not the jury, imposes the sentence. In some cases, the judge's
role should be limited to determining which dispositional alternative bal-
ances the child's best interests with those of public safety. The jury and
the judge would each occupy a necessary position, and the child would
have the advantage of a carefully analyzed and reasoned decision.16 8
163. See MINN. STAT. § 593.41, subd. 2(2) (1982) (juror must be at least 18 years old);
cf. Arthur, supra note 64.
164. See MINN. STAT. § 593.41 (1982).
165. For example, an adult defendant may have a jury with a wide range of ages with
no one near his or her own age.
166. The only age restriction is a minimum age of 18. MINN. STAT. § 593.41, subd.
2(2) (1982).
167. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968). The
Duncan Court stated, "Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." 391 U.S. at 156.
It should be noted that the juvenile in Minnesota does not necessarily receive a trial
before a judge. MINN. R. Juv. P. 2.01 (1984). "[A] referee may hear, as authorized by
statute [MINN. STAT. § 260.031 (1982)], any matter under the jurisdiction of the court in
the manner provided for the hearing of matters by the court." Id The juvenile is permit-
ted to object to the hearing before the referee and be heard before a judge. MINN. R. Juv.
P. 2.02 (1984). A court may review all or part of the referee's findings. MINN. R. Juv. P.
2.04 (1984). The juvenile court referee is not required to be a lawyer. See Stuart, supra
note 9, at 80-89 (discussion of role of referees in Minnesota's juvenile courts).
In his article, Mr. Stuart presented a chart which demonstrated that the majority of
juvenile court cases were held before a referee in Hennepin County:
Detention hearings: 2100 (97% of such matters heard)
Arraignments: 2600 (95%)
Adult references: 1 (1%)
Pre-arraignments/Omnibus: 410 (95%)
Default trials: 180 (98%)




Id at 84. "In short, of the nine kinds of hearings in the repertoire of the court, the Henne-
pin County Juvenile Court referees handled the vast majority of cases in eight categories,
leaving only references for adult prosecution as the near-exclusive preserve of the judge."
Id.
168. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 657, 708.
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C The Jug Trial's Efect on the Informal Atmosphere ofjuvenzle Proceedings
Minnesota provides that juvenile hearings may be conducted in an
informal manner.16 9 The integration of juries would add an additional
element of formality to the proceedings. The importance of the informal
ideal, however, has been questioned by several commentators.170 Many
courts continue to rely on informality, stating that the purpose of infor-
mality is to allow the judge to act in a paternalistic role, thereby gaining
the trust and confidence of the juvenile.71 The initial consensus was
that a "child was not to feel he was being dealt with as a criminal, but
that the parent-state was taking him under its protective wing and guid-
ing his future."' 7 2 Today, this concept is outdated. To the child being
169. MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 1 (1982). Section 260.155 provides in relevant part:
"Except for hearings arising under section 260.261 [jurisdiction over offense of contribut-
ing to delinquency or neglect], hearings on any matter shall be without a jury and may be
conducted in an informal manner." Id The tenor of the recently adopted Minnesota
Juvenile Court Rules is quite different:
(A) Tn'ai Rights. The child's counsel and the county attorney shall have the
right to:
(i) present evidence, and
(ii) present witnesses, and
(iii) cross-examine witnesses, and
(iv) present arguments in support of or against the allegations of the
petition.
(B) Thnai Order. The order of the hearing shall be as follows:
(i) the county attorney may make an opening statement, confining the
statement to the facts that the state expects to prove, and
(ii) the child's counsel may make an opening statement, or make it imme-
diately before offering evidence. The statement shall be confined to a
statement of the defense and the facts expected to be proved, and
(iii) the county attorney shall offer evidence in support of the petition, and
(iv) the child's counsel may offer evidence in defense of the child, and
(v) the county attorney may offer evidence in rebuttal of the defense evi-
dence, and the child's counsel may then offer evidence in rebuttal of
the county attorney's rebuttal evidence. In the interests of justice the
court may permit either the county attorney or the child's counsel to
offer evidence upon the original case, and
(vi) at the conclusion of the evidence, the county attorney may make a
closing argument, and
(vii) the child's counsel may make a closing argument.
MINN. R. Juv. P. 27.03, subd. 2 (1984). This is essentially identical to the procedure
followed in the adult criminal court. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 11 (1984).
170. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 19, at 19; Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the
Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 694, 695 (1966); Studt, The Client's Image oftheJuvenile Court in,
JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 200 (Rosenheim ed. 1962); Note, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A
Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 650, 689 (1972).
171. People v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 276, 282, 285 P. 871,874 (1930); see also
United States v. Cuomo, 525 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1976) (juvenile proceedings intended to
be intimate, informal, protective, and paternalistic); In re D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d
627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 926 (1970). See generally Note, supra note 170,
at 657-59.
172. Comment, supra note 5, at 828; see also Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV.
104, 120 (1909). Professor Mack states:
The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be made to know
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processed through the juvenile system, the proceedings already appear
formal. 173
In Minnesota, the juvenile proceeding is "no longer an informal
event." ' 7 4 "The juvenile trial is held in a courtroom in front of a robed
judge sitting behind a bench. The formal rules of courtroom decorum
and dress apply. A court reporter transcribes the entire proceeding.
There is a formal written complaint presented by the Assistant County
Attorney."1 75 The procedure essentially parallels adult proceedings.'
76
The child necessarily perceives a real and formal proceeding.
One commentator suggests that formality in a juvenile system is actu-
ally "more therapeutic and rehabilitative than the traumatizing effects of
an informal adjudicatory hearing at which the child is deprived of basic
rights."1 77 In Minnesota, where juvenile proceedings are already formal,
the jury trial's minimal increase in formality would not have a deletari-
ous effect. The jury trial may serve to impress upon the juvenile the
gravity and severity of the offense, hopefully creating a deterrent ef-
fect. 178 "Unless appropriate due process is followed, even the juvenile
who has violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated and
may therefore resist the efforts of court personnel."179 "[F]air treatment
is frequently viewed as helpful to rehabilitation since juveniles who are
that he is face to face with the power of the state, but he should know at the same
time, and more emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of its care and
solicitude. The ordinary trappings of the courtroom are out of place in such
hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar,
can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at
his side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the
lad to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain im-
mensely in the effectiveness of his work.
Id This may have been the ideal in 1909, but the concept is not in practice today. See
supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
173. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 51, at 10.
174. Response Memorandum, supra note 103, at 15.
175. Id; see also MINN. R. Juv. P. 27 (1984) (dealing with timing, procedure, eviden-
tiary matters, and findings of juvenile proceedings).
176. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
177. Comment, supra note 5, at 832.
178. Id at 832-33; see, e.g., Parker, Instant Maturation for the Post- Gault "Hood'" 4 FAM.
L.Q. 113 (1970); Paulsen, Kent v. United States, The Constitutional Context ofJuvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 167, 186; Note, supra note 170, at 689; Note, supra note 5, at 284. But
see, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 37, at 559.
179. S. WHEELER & L. COTTRELL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-ITS PREVENTION AND
CONTROL 33 (1966). A report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice states:
There is increasing evidence that the informal procedures, contrary to the origi-
nal expectation, may themselves constitute a further obstacle to effective treat-
ment of the delinquent to the extent that they engender in the child a sense of
injustice provoked by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of au-
thority by judges and probation officers.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 85 (1967).
[Vol. 10
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accorded due process rights may be unable to rationalize away their de-
linquent acts on the grounds that they were not given their legal rights
and therefore, treated unfairly."180 A paternalistic, informal proceeding
is less likely to deter the hard-core offender.
D. The Juvenile Adversary System
Courts have expressed concern that jury trials would create a full-
blown adversary process, vest the proceeding with the appearance of a
criminal trial, and make the child feel like a criminal. 181 This argument
is unpersuasive because an adversary system already exists in Minne-
sota's juvenile courts. The recently adopted Minnesota Rules of Juvenile
Procedure require an elaborate juvenile court process 8 2 closely resem-
bling adult criminal proceedings.18 3 Therefore, concerns about imple-
menting an adversary system in Minnesota are moot.
E The Efficiency ofJuvenileJuiy Trials
Critics of the juvenile jury trial also claim that it would create an un-
due administrative burden on the courts.' 8 4 While "many juvenile
courts are overcrowded and understaffed,"185 the integration of juvenile
jury trials would not create a significant increase in the burden. 8 6 The
Supreme Court dissenters in McKeiver 187 refuted the argument by noting
the experiences of states allowing juries.188 Those states experienced no
major burden on their courts and no flood of requests for jury trials by
juveniles. 189
In 1970, the National Juvenile Justice Center examined eleven juris-
dictons providing juries for juveniles and found that: "[W]here a jury
trial is available by statute it is seldom used and creates no burden on the
juvenile court system . . . .None of the data collected indicated that the
extension of this right to the remaining states would significantly affect
the efficiency of the juvenile courts."' 9 0 Another study, conducted in
180. Kittle, supra note 7, at 96.
181. See, e.g., 403 U.S. at 550; In re Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1977); Dryden v.
Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Ky. 1958).
182. MINN. R. Juv. P. 27.03, subd. 2 (1984);supra note 169 (text of rule 27.03, subd. 2).
183. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 11 (1984).
184. This unexpressed fear may have swayed the McKeiver Court. See Ketcham, supra
note 5, at 567.
. 185. Comment, supra note 5, at 834; see Note, The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 38, 118 (1971).
186. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
187. 403 U.S. at 557-72 (Douglas, Black, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
188. The two states allowing juveniles juries were Colorado and Michigan. For the
current listing of states giving juveniles the right to a jury trial, see supra notes 81-82.
189. 403 U.S. at 564-65.
190. Burch & Knapp, The Impact ofJury Trials on the Admtnistration ofJuvenile Justie, 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 345, 360 (1970), cited in Stuart & Bush, supra note 103, at 10 n.7.
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1978,191 revealed that the frequency of jury trials ranged from a low of
.36% to a high of 3.2% of the entire juvenile caseload. 192 Jury trials are
rarely requested by juveniles. 193 The implementation of jury trials could
actually serve to reduce the caseload because county attorneys would be
forced to process only meritorious cases.1
94
Fundamental rights outweigh concerns about de minimus administra-
tive burdens. The right to trial by jury is fundamental when a person is
faced with a serious loss of liberty, 195 and fundamental fairness is the
constitutional standard in delinquency cases.1 96 Thus, denying juveniles
the right to a jury trial because of a potential for slightly diminished
administrative efficiency may be fundamentally unfair.
F Jury Trials and Confidentiah'ty
Courts attempt to keep juvenile proceedings confidential. 197 Presuma-
bly, confidentiality aids rehabilitation by eliminating the criminal stigma
191. Burch & Knapp, supra note 190, at 360.
192. Id
193. For example, in 1980, two commentators examined the number of jury trials in
Hennepin County criminal court. Stuart & Bush, supra note 103. These figures were then
used to advance a hypothesis on the number of juvenile jury trials that could be expected
in Hennepin County:
In Hennepin County courts (District and Municipal) in 1979, there were 18,373
defendants charged with felonies, gross misdemeanors or misdemeanors. Only
219 of those cases (1.19%) resulted in a trial by jury. In Hennepin County Juve-
nile Court, 4,552 delinquency petitions were filed in 1979. If the adult percent-
age is any guide, there would be 54 jury trials in a year in juvenile court.
Id This figure is probably higher than would actually occur because jury trials are rarely
requested by juveniles. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 565-66 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting). See generally Case Comment, supra note 5, at 256.
194. In Minnesota, the "discretionary decision as to whether a delinquency or petty
matter should be initiated lies with the county attorney." MINN. R. Juv. P. 17 (1984).
195. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968).
196. See id at 147-50; see also MeKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 533, 545.
197. Minnesota conducts a private hearing for juveniles pursuant to Minnesota Stat-
utes section 260.155, subdivision 1, which provides in part: "The court shall exclude the
general public from these hearings and shall admit only those persons who, in the discre-
tion of the court, have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court." MINN.
STAT. § 260.155, subd. 1 (1982).
Rule 8.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court provides:
Only the following may attend hearings:
(a) the child, guardian ad litem and counsel for the child, and
(b) the parent(s) and guardian of the child and their counsel and guardian
ad litem and the legal custodian of the child and
(c) the spouse of the child, and
(d) the county attorney, and
(e) persons requested by the child, the county attorney, or the parent(s) and
guardian of the child and approved by the court, and
(1) persons authorized by the court under such conditions as the court may
approve, and
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attached to a public trial.198 Some commentators believe that a jury in
juvenile court would destroy the confidentiality traditionally surround-
ing the proceedings. This concern may be unwarranted because, realisti-
cally, juvenile proceedings are not particularly confidential.
The Supreme Court in Gault criticized the claim of secrecy calling it
"more rhetoric than reality."199 Individuals and organizations, includ-
ing the FBI, government agencies, the military, social service agencies,
and sometimes even private employers, may have access to information
about juvenile offenses.200 Moreover, the juvenile's friends, family, rela-
tives, and neighbors are likely to be aware of the proceedings.
20
A court has two options: the jurors may be sworn to secrecy, or the
proceedings may be opened to the public. Although opening juvenile
proceedings to the public is usually discussed in the context of the first
amendment, 20 2 opening juvenile proceedings could foster the public
scrutiny Justice Brennan found so laudable in McKeiver. 203 Swearing ju-
rors to secrecy may be a more realistic option because many juvenile
courts cling to the ideal of absolute confidentiality. 204 The name of the
juvenile could remain undisclosed, or a pseudonym could be used.
20 5
The court's contempt power could be invoked to ensure the confidential-
ity of the proceedings. 2 06 Swearing jurors to secrecy would not burden
the court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Minnesota's Juvenile Act is continually being amended, expanded,
and modernized. With the advent of more punitive laws relating to de-
linquent children, the substantial gulf initially perceived between the
adult criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings has diminished.
The criminal and juvenile courts are now substantially equivalent, with
the exception of the increased confidentiality of the juvenile system.
MINN. R. Juv. P. 8.01 (1984).
The records pertaining to juvenile matters are closed to the public. MINN. STAT.
§ 260.161, subds. 2-3 (1982).
198. Amicus Curiae Memorandum, supra note 107, at 11.
199. 387 U.S. at 24.
200. See id at 24-25; see also Cashman, Confidentiality ofJuvenile Court Proceedings: A Re-
view, Juv. JUST., Aug. 1973, at 30, 35; Note, supra note 5, at 286-89; Note, Juvenile
Delinquents: The Pohwe, State Courts, and IndividualizedJustice, 79 HARv. L. REV. 775, 784-87,
800 (1965); cf. MINN. R. Juv. P. 34 (1984) (controlling access to the juvenile's records-
records not released to employers or military personnel); Ketcham, The Unfufilled Promise of
theJuvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DEUNQ. 97, 102-03 (1961); Comment, supra note 5, at 818-19.
201. Comment, supra note 5, at 827.
202. See supra note 59.
203. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
204. See Response Memorandum, supra note 103, at 16-17; Amicus Curiae Memoran-
dum, supra note 107, at 11; Comment, supra note 5, at 828.
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Thus, juveniles should be afforded the right to a jury trial in juvenile
court.
Hypothesized concerns of administrative burden, creation of an adver-
sary system, and formalization are easily remedied. A formalized adver-
sary system already exists in Minnesota. Even if an increased
administrative burden resulted, it is likely that fewer weak cases would
be prosecuted. In the final analysis, juveniles should not be denied the
fundamental right to a jury trial because of administrative problems.
Due process is a more important concern. A juvenile offender will
have greater respect for Minnesota's courts if afforded the full adult pan-
oply of constitutional safeguards. The recidivist juvenile will more likely
be deterred from future criminal misconduct when faced with the full
impact and gravity of the offense.
Juries will protect against the possibility of juvenile courts' findings
being influenced by inadmissible evidence disclosed in pretrial proceed-
ings. The court will rule on evidentiary issues, but will not have to pre-
tend to be unaware of a prejudicial piece of inadmissible evidence. The
jury will hear the facts, and the judge will impose the sentence.
McKeiver did not forbid juvenile jury trials. Rather, the Court en-
couraged states to experiment with their systems in the hope of reaching
the rehabilitative ideal. With the exception of the Duluth system, Min-
nesota has not experimented with juvenile jury trials. It has deviated
from rehabilitation by enacting punitive laws for children while continu-
ing to deny the right to a jury trial. The civil label cannot change the
punitive effect of the laws. The time has come to accept McKewver's chal-
lenge and expand the accused child's rights to include the fundamental
right of trial by jury.
[Vol. 10
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